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1 INTRODUCTION & IEC 61508 
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) play a major part 
in industrial risk management as risk reduction meas-
ures. The main European standard for functional 
safety of SIS, denoted electrical / electronic / pro-
grammable electronic (E/E/PE) safety-related sys-
tems, is the IEC 61508 (IEC, 2005a). The second 
edition will soon be adopted in 2009 (IEC, 2009). 
Objectives are to enable the design of SIS, and the 
development of application sector standards. Such 
examples are IEC 61511 (IEC, 2004) for process in-
dustry, and IEC 62061 (IEC 2005b) for machinery. 
One of the main contributions of IEC 61508 is to 
consider the overall system and software safety life 
cycle. The standard framework, with the correspond-
ing normative parts and subclauses, is: 
1 development of the overall safety requirements 
(SR): concept, scope definition, hazard and risk 
analysis, overall SR specification (Part 1: 7.2-7.5); 
2 SR allocation to the designated SIS or other risk 
reduction measures (Part 1: 7.6); 
3 SR specification for each SIS in order to achieve 
the required functional safety (Part 1: 7.10); 
4 realisation phase for SIS design and development 
in accordance with SR specification, for system 
(Part 2) and software (Part 3); 
5 installation, commissioning, safety validation, in-
cluding planning (Part 1: 7.8-7.9 and 7.13-7.14); 
6 operation, maintenance, modification, and de-
commissioning (Part 1: 7.7 and 7.15-7.18). 
Other requirements, regarding all phases, are about 
documentation (Part 1: 5); management of functional 
safety (Part 1: 6); functional safety assessment (Part 
1: 8); and verification (Part 1: 7.18). Part 4 gives 
definitions and abbreviations. The other parts are in-
formative: guidelines to determine overall SR (Part 
5), guidelines for realisation phase (Part 6), and an 
overview of techniques and measures (Part 7). 
Safety requirements (SR) refer to safety function 
and safety integrity. A safety function has to be im-
plemented by a SIS or other risk reduction measures 
to achieve or maintain a safe state of the equipment 
under control (EUC). The probability of a SIS satis-
factorily performing the specified safety function is 
the safety integrity. Safety integrity values are ar-
ranged in four discrete levels, denoted safety integrity 
levels (SIL), according to target failure measures. 
For example, Table 1 applies to safety functions op-
erating in low demand mode. 
According to IEC, 2009, a safety-related system is 
regarded as low complexity if the failure modes of 
each individual component are well defined, and the 
behaviour of the system under fault conditions can be 
completely determined. This paper focuses on SIS to 
which this definition does not apply. 
The realisation phase is investigated in Section 2. 
Some issues linked to the system complexity are dis-
cussed in Section 3, and a fault tree based approach 
is proposed. An intelligent transmitter is used as an 
example in Section 4, for both failure rates and be-
haviour uncertainty analyses. Finally, discussions are 
given in Section 5. 
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ABSTRACT: According to IEC 61508, a safety-related system is regarded as type B if it presents a high com-
plexity (i.e. the failure mode of at least one component is not well defined, or the behaviour under fault condi-
tions cannot be completely determined), or if there is insufficient data to support claims for failure rates. This 
paper proposes a modelling method adapted to the evaluation of failure probabilities for systems with uncertain 
behaviour under fault conditions. To this aim, weighted “continuous gates” are introduced in a fault tree frame-
work. By acting on weight values, it is then allowed to continuously graduate system part architectures be-
tween series and parallel structures. An intelligent transmitter is used as example. Probabilities of failure on 
demand are assessed, with both failure rates and behaviour uncertainty analyses. Results tend to show that the 
lack of knowledge in system behaviour can be partially handled by this kind of approach. 
 
Table 1.  SIL and corresponding target failure measures 
for a safety function operating in low demand mode ______________________________________________ 
SIL Average probability of dangerous failure 
of the safety function on demand (PFDavg) ______________________________________________ 
SIL 4      10-5 ≤ PFDavg < 10-4 
SIL 3      10-4 ≤ PFDavg < 10-3 
SIL 2      10-3 ≤ PFDavg < 10-2 
SIL 1      10-2 ≤ PFDavg < 10-1 ______________________________________________ 
2 DESIGN IN ACCORDANCE WITH IEC 61508 
2.1 Inputs and objectives of the realisation phase 
Before starting the SIS realisation phase, the overall 
safety requirements have been previously developed, 
as well as the SR allocation and specification. The 
following inputs are then available: 
 the safety functions to carry out by the SIS; 
 the mode of operation of each safety function; 
 the target failure measures with associated SIL. 
In the present paper, only the low demand mode of 
operation is assumed (i.e. the safety function is only 
performed on demand, and not more than one per 
year). The target failure measure is then defined by 
the average probability of dangerous failure on de-
mand of the safety function (PFDavg), and the associ-
ated SIL is determined by Table 1. Note that these 
definitions stem from IEC 61508, 2009 revision, 
which are more precise than in the first edition. 
The objective of the realisation phase is then to 
create the SIS conforming to the specification, espe-
cially in terms of safety functions and allocating SIL. 
This paper focuses on system requirements (Part 2), 
and does not develop software aspects (Part 3). The 
realisation phase consists of design requirement 
specification (for subsystems and elements), design 
and development, integration (software integration 
refers to Part 3), operation and maintenance, valida-
tion, modification, and verification. 
In the following sections, the SIS design and de-
velopment is detailed, according to hardware, sys-
tematic, and other safety requirements. 
2.2 Hardware safety integrity requirements 
The requirements for hardware safety integrity con-
tain architectural constraints and random hardware 
failure quantification. The former are based on: 
 the hardware fault tolerance (HFT), equal to N if 
N+1 is the minimum number of faults that could 
cause a loss of the safety function; 
 the safe failure fraction (SFF), defined by the ratio 
of the average failure rates of safe or detected fail-
ures by diagnostic tests, to the total failures. 
These two parameters are then used to determine the 
maximum allowable SIL for the safety function, ac-
cording to system type A or B. For example, Table 2 
applies to type B systems. 
 
Table 2. Maximum allowable SIL for a safety function 
carried out by a type B safety-related system ______________________________________________ 
Safe failure fraction (SFF) Hardware fault tolerance (HFT)           ________________________ 
          0    1    2 ______________________________________________ 
SFF < 60%     -    SIL 1  SIL 2 
60% ≤ SFF < 90%   SIL 1  SIL 2  SIL 3 
90% ≤ SFF < 99%   SIL 2  SIL 3  SIL 4 
99% ≤ SFF     SIL 3  SIL 4  SIL 4 ______________________________________________ 
Route 2H*      SIL 1-2  SIL 3  SIL 4 ______________________________________________ 
*Alternative route proposed by IEC, 2009 
 
Low complexity systems with available significant 
feedback data are regarded as type A. Conversely, 
type B systems are defined by at least one of these 
properties: 
 the failure mode of at least one constituent com-
ponent is not well defined; 
 the behaviour of the system under fault conditions 
cannot be completely determined; 
 there is insufficient dependable failure data to 
support claims for rates of failures for detected 
and undetected dangerous failures. 
More insight into architectural constraints is pro-
vided by Lundteigen, 2009. SFF has been especially 
questioned by Innal, 2006 and Langeron, 2007. As a 
general conclusion, SFF is not an appropriate indica-
tor for safety integrity. An alternative “route” is then 
proposed by the second edition of IEC 61508. It is 
based on reliability feedback data from end users, and 
does not consider SFF (see Table 2, “Route 2H”). In 
that case, a special requirement for type B systems is 
a diagnostic coverage (i.e. proportion of average 
dangerous failure rates detected by diagnostic tests) 
equal to or greater than 60%. 
Requirements for quantifying the effect of random 
hardware failures consist of a list a parameters to be 
taken into account: system architecture, dangerous 
failure rates which are detected or not by diagnostic 
tests, diagnostic test coverage and interval, common 
cause failures, proof tests interval and effectiveness, 
repair times (if EUC is not maintained in a safe state 
during repair), and random human error effects. 
Methods for the target failure measure evaluation are 
mentioned (e.g. fault trees, reliability block diagrams, 
Markov models, and Petri nets), and guidelines are 
given in Part 6, but for information only. Discussions 
about type B system issues for the evaluation of the 
average probability of dangerous failure on demand 
are proposed in Section 3. 
2.3 Systematic safety integrity requirements 
To prevent the introduction of faults during the de-
sign and development of the SIS hardware and soft-
ware, requirements for the avoidance and control of 
systematic faults (i.e. related in a deterministic way 
to a certain cause) are introduced. Techniques and 
measures are given in Part 2: Annexes A and B. 
The systematic safety requirements can also be 
fulfilled by demonstrating that the system is proven in 
use. Such criteria are discussed by Beurden, 2004. 
2.4 Other requirements 
Other requirements refer to system behaviour upon 
detection of a fault (basically, specified actions have 
to achieve or maintain a safe state of the EUC when 
a dangerous fault is detected); data communication 
processes (taking into account transmission errors, 
repetitions, delays etc.); and special architectures for 
integrated circuits with on-chip redundancy, if rele-
vant (Part 2: Annex E). 
3 MODEL FOR COMPLEX SYSTEMS 
3.1 Type B safety-related system issues 
The lack of data to support claims for failure rates is 
an issue which is widely investigated by data uncer-
tainty analyses. For example, Hauptmanns, 2008 
compares the use of reliability data stemming from 
different sources on probabilistic safety calculations, 
and tends to prove that results do not differ substan-
tially. Wang, 2004 discusses and identifies the inputs 
that may lead to SIL estimation changes.  Propaga-
tion of error, Monte Carlo, and Bayesian methods 
(Guérin, 2003) are quite common. Fuzzy set theory 
is also often used to handle data uncertainties, espe-
cially into fault tree analyses (Tanaka, 1983, Singer, 
1990). Other approaches are based on evidence, pos-
sibility, and interval analyses (Helton, 2004). 
The non-low complexity properties, used to de-
scribe type B systems (i.e. not well defined failure 
modes; undetermined system behaviour), are much 
less investigated in literature. However, research 
work is focusing on microprocessor or software 
based safety systems and aims to identify unknown 
hazards (Garrett, 2002), or evaluating parameters for 
SIL calculation (Camargo, 2001). 
Models used to quantify probabilities of failure re-
quire setting the system responses to events (e.g. the 
choice of gates into fault trees, the state boundaries 
into Markov diagrams). The behaviour of the system 
under fault conditions therefore must be completely 
determined in most of the models, maybe apart from 
a few fuzzy approaches (Pan, 1997). Moreover, it is 
difficult to analyse the impact of model architecture 
(e.g. fault tree gates, Markov diagram states and 
transitions) on results in a coherent manner, as it is 
common to do with input data. In fact, these con-
straints are usually of a discrete nature and are very 
significant, since architecture changes could often 
yield unrealistic configurations. 
The next section aims to define a reliability ap-
proach which fits the properties of type B systems, 
and allows both input data (i.e. failure rates) and be-
haviour uncertainty analyses. 
3.2 Continuous gate for fault tree 
Fault trees, which are equivalent to reliability block 
diagrams, are common in industry. Moreover, they 
provide an efficient tool for SIL calculations, under 
some quantification warnings (Signoret, 2007). A 
fault tree based approach is therefore chosen in the 
present paper. 
To deal with the uncertain behaviour of systems 
under fault conditions, a continuous fault tree gate, 
denoted C-gate, is introduced, and depicted in Fig-
ure 1. N basic events Ei are given with attributing 
weights pi. The top-event gate then occurs if at least 
one of these options is fulfilled: 
 option 1: any basic event Ei occurs and causes, 
with a probability equal to pi, the top-event gate 
occurrence; 
 option 2: all the basic events Ei occur. 
By introducing fictitious events Pi which occur with 
constant probability equal to pi, a C-gate is equiva-
lent to the fault tree given by Figure 2. The “direct” 
or-gate refers to option 1, and the “logic” and-gate 
to option 2. Assuming all events independent, let: 
 Fi(t) be the probability that the basic event Ei oc-
curs at time t; 
 pi be the constant probability that the fictitious 
event Pi occurs at time t. 
The top-event gate probability of occurrence at time 
t, denoted Ftop(t), can then be expressed as follows 
(see proof in Appendix): 
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Figure 3 plots results of Equation (1) with N=3, 
Fi(t)=1-e-0.001·t for i=1,…,N, and the weights pi re-
ported in Table 3. 
Note that when all the weights are equal to 0, a C-
gate is equivalent to an and-gate (i.e. parallel struc-
ture); and when all the weights are equal to 1, a C-
gate is equivalent to an or-gate (i.e. series structure). 
Any coherent system reliability is comprised between 
parallel (for the most reliable case) and series (for the 
least reliable case) structure function (Rausand, 
2004). By acting on the weights, a C-gate then al-
lows continuous graduation of the system architec-
ture (i.e. its behaviour under fault conditions). More-
over, the system analyses can be performed by 
classical tools, using equivalent fault trees. 
 
 
Figure 1. C-gate for fault tree 
 
Table 3. C-gate unreliability functions, see Equation (1) ______________________________________________ 
Weight       Unreliability function ________________________ 
p1    p2    p3 ______________________________________________ 
0    0    0    F[0.0](t) / parallel structure 
0.5   0    0    F[0.5](t) 
0.5   0.5   0    F[1.0](t) 
0.5   0.5   0.5   F[1.5](t) 
1    0.5   0.5   F[2.0](t) 
1    1    0.5   F[2.5](t) 
1    1    1    F[3.0](t) / series structure ______________________________________________ 
 
 








Figure 4. “3-step” (faults and failures–material elements–functions) fault tree for infrared gas transmitter, using C-gates 
 
 
4 INTELLIGENT TRANSMITTER EXAMPLE 
4.1 Intelligent transmitter 
A transmitter can be described as “intelligent” ac-
cording to its ability to modify its internal behaviour 
to optimize data collection and communicate them in 
a response manner to a host system (Brignell, 1996); 
and to the bi-directional communication for sending 
measurement and status information and receiving 
and processing external commands (IEC, 2006). 
Moreover, intelligent transmitters take advantage of 
digital technologies to allow specific functionalities 
(Brissaud, 2008): error measurement correction, self-
adjustment, self-diagnosis and validation, on-line re-
configuration, and digital bidirectional communica-
tion. Such transmitters integrate programmable units 
and software, then the consequences of faults or fail-
ures on functions are difficult to predict. Intelligent 
transmitters are therefore examples of type B systems 
according to their behaviour under fault conditions 
which cannot be completely determined. 
A transmitter for gas concentration measurement 
by infrared absorption is used as a case study. It is 
made up of two infrared units: the working unit 
sends a ray with a proportional wavelength to the gas 
concentration to be measured; and the reference unit 
sends a ray which does not respond to the gas. 
Through a wavelength ratio of the two receiving 
rays, the gas concentration quantity is obtained with 
a correction of the optics clogging up (mirror and 
plane), and power fluctuation of sending rays, if both 
are in acceptable ranges. Heating elements aim to 
prevent steam from building up on optics. Tempera-
ture is an important gas concentration influencing 
quantity. Two redundant sensors are therefore used 
for digital compensation of temperature while being 
in acceptable ranges. Finally, a data processing unit 
carries out all processing and calculations. 
The safety function analysed in this paper is to 
measure gas concentration. It consists of obtaining 
measuring data (rays from working and reference in-
frared units, through the optics, and temperature) 
and processing them with appropriate digital correc-
tions. This last function requires off-set and gain drift 
parameters which are defined by self-adjustments. 
4.2 Fault tree for intelligent transmitter 
A fault tree for the infrared gas transmitter example, 
using C-gates, is given by Figure 4. To deal with in-
teractions between functions and material elements, a 
“3-step” approach is proposed (Brissaud, 2008). 
That is, the safety function to be evaluated (measure 
gas concentration) is broken up into subfunctions 
(obtain measuring data and process measuring data) 
and supporting functions (self-adjustment) which im-
pact the former (self-adjustment aims to define pa-
rameters which are then used by the measuring data 
processing). 
The second step of the fault tree represents the 
material elements which are required by the func-
tions. Some elements are more critical than others for 
function fulfilments (attributed weights in C-gates 
differ). For example, temperature sensors are almost 
always essential to self-adjustment (this property is 
due to the algorithm of off-set and gain drift defini-
tion, which requires temperature as a main parame-
ter), whereas in some cases, a failure of these sensors 
still allows obtaining of efficient measuring data (e.g. 
when temperature compensation is not significant). 
Similarly, depending on the failure of the data proc-
essing unit, it can yield a direct malfunction of the 
measuring data processing, or only an error in self-
adjustment, which may also impact the measuring 
data processing as an indirect relationship. 
The last step is a list of all potential faults and fail-
ures that the system may experience. Failures can be 
independent (i.e. impact only one element), or com-
mon to several material elements. Note that some 
faults or failures may have undetermined conse-
quences on material elements, for example, due to 
not well defined failure modes (e.g. the degree of 
clogging up leading the optics into a failed state), or 
environmental constraints which are difficult to pre-
dict at any time (the loss of optic heating may have 
no impact on the system if, at that moment, the tem-
perature and humidity are suitable). 
4.3 Fault tree analyses 
The weight values used for the C-gates are given in 
Table 4 (column “Base value”). The probability of 
fault or failure i at time t (i.e. occurrence of basic 
event Di, see Figure 4), with i=1,…,9, is equal to 
Fi(t)=1-e-λi∙t with λi being the rate of fault or failure i, 
given in Table 5 (column “Base value”). 
The following assumptions are made: 
 only dangerous failures which are not detected by 
online diagnostic test are taken into account; 
 no maintenance action is performed in time inter-
val [0, 12 months]; 
 at the end of the 12th month, test and maintenance 
actions are performed in such a way that the sys-
tem is restored to an as good as new condition. 
The fault tree analyses are performed using equiva-
lent fault trees (see Figure 2), and SimTree, the fault 
tree module of the Aralia WorkShop software tool, 
distributed by Dassault Systemes. 249 minimal cut 
sets (MCS) have been obtained and are arranged by 
orders in Table 6. Probability of failure on demand of 
the safety function measure gas concentration (i.e. 
occurrence of the top-event gate MGC, see Figure 4) 
at time t, denoted PFD(t), is depicted in Figure 5. 
The average value on time interval [0, 12 months], 
denoted PFDavg, is equal to 8.73∙10-3 and is also re-
ported in Figure 5. According to Table 1, the safety 
function therefore fulfils SIL 2. 
 
Table 4. Weight values __________________________________________________ 
Type*  Name Base value   Uncertainty analysis            _________________________ 
           law**   mean variance __________________________________________________ 
low   pL   0.10   U[0.0, 0.2] 0.10  3.3∙10-3 
medium pM  0.50   U[0.2, 0.8] 0.50  3.0∙10-2 
high   pH   0.90   U[0.8, 1.0] 0.90  3.3∙10-3 __________________________________________________ 
* see Figure 4 caption 
** U[a, b] is a uniform distribution between a and b 
 
Table 5. Failure rates __________________________________________________ 
Name  Base value     Uncertainty analysis          _____________________________ 
    [hour-1]   law*    mean  variance __________________________________________________ 
λ1    4.0∙10-7   log-Normal 4.0∙10-7  3.2∙10-14 
λ2    1.0∙10-7   log-Normal 1.0∙10-7  2.0∙10-15 
λ3    4.0∙10-7   log-Normal 4.0∙10-7  3.2∙10-14 
λ4    1.0∙10-6   log-Normal 1.0∙10-6  2.0∙10-13 
λ5    3.0∙10-6   log-Normal 3.0∙10-6  1.8∙10-12 
λ6    5.0∙10-7   log-Normal 5.0∙10-7  4.9∙10-14 
λ7    1.5∙10-7   log-Normal 1.5∙10-7  4.5∙10-15 
λ8    5.0∙10-7   log-Normal 5.0∙10-7  4.9∙10-14 
λ9    5.0∙10-7   log-Normal 5.0∙10-7  4.9∙10-14 __________________________________________________ 
* the parameters {µ,σ} of the log-Normal distributions are 
equal to {ln(mean)-σ2/2,ln(EF)/1.645}, with EF=5 
 
Table 6. Minimal cut sets (MCS) arranged by orders __________________________________________________ 
Order   Number of MCS Cumulative number of MCS __________________________________________________ 
1     000      000 
2     000      000 
3     007      007 
4     038      045 
5     050      095 
6     100      195 
7     042      237 
8     012      249 __________________________________________________ 
 
Table 7. Uncertainty analysis configurations __________________________________________________ 
Configuration  Uncertainty analysis on __________________________________________________ 
Config.1    Failure rates only 
Config.2    System behaviour (i.e. weight values) only 
Config.3    Failure rates and system behaviour __________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8. Uncertainty analysis results, obtained by 1,000,000 
Monte Carlo simulations __________________________________________________ 
Configuration  Mean  Variance P[SIL2]  P[SIL1] __________________________________________________ 
Config.1    8.69∙10-3 1.5∙10-5  0.74   0.26 
Config.2    8.73∙10-3 2.9∙10-6  0.78   0.22 
Config.3    8.68∙10-3 2.0∙10-5  0.74   0.26 __________________________________________________ 
 
 
Figure 5. Probability of dangerous failure on demand at time t, 
PFD(t), and on average, PFDavg 
4.4 Uncertainty analyses 
System behaviour uncertainty can be translated into 
uncertainties in C-gate weight values (see Section 
3.2). Uniform distributions are used to represent the 
uncertainties in weight values, according to weight 
type (i.e. low, medium, high), as reported in Table 4 
(column “Uncertainty analysis”). It is assumed that 
extreme values (i.e. low and high weights) are more 
uncertain than the middle value (i.e. medium weight), 
as shown by the variances. Note also that these dis-
tributions are defined in such a way that the expec-
tancies are equal to the base values. 
To represent the uncertainties in failure rates, log-
Normal distributions are more common. The parame-
ters are defined in order to have a mean value equal 
to the base value, and an error factor equal to 5 (i.e. 
the lower and upper bounds of the 90% centred con-
fidence interval are obtained by dividing and multi-
plying the median value by 5, respectively). 
The uncertainty analyses are performed by Monte 
Carlo simulations. To make calculations faster, it is 
assumed that the PFD(t) is a linear function accord-
ing to time, in interval [0, 12 months] (see Figure 5, 
the coefficient of determination has been computed 
at one minus 1.39∙10-5). The PFDavg can therefore be 
obtained by the following approximation: 
2
)12( monthsPFDPFDavg   (2) 
The three uncertainty configurations which are 
described in Table 7 are analysed. For each of them, 
1,000,000 draws of Monte Carlo simulations have 
been performed to obtain several PFDavg results by 
Equation (2). The resulting probability density func-
tions of PFDavg are depicted in Figure 6. The means 
and variances are given in Table 8 with the probabil-
ity of being in SIL 2 or SIL 1, according to Table 1. 
Note that in all of these configurations, the means 
are nearly equal to the PFDavg value obtained in Sec-
tion 4.3. The variances are of 10-5 to 10-6 order, and 
the probabilities of SIL fulfilments are very close 
among the configurations. Moreover, assuming the 
uncertainties in failure rates, the addition of system 




Figure 6. Probability density function of PFDavg according to 
the configurations given in Table 8, obtained by Monte Carlo 
simulations, after smoothing 
5 DISCUSSION 
The previous analyses have shown that taking system 
behaviour uncertainties into account leads to an av-
erage probability of failure on demand with a rela-
tively small variance (orders of magnitude lower than 
any of the weight variances). These results therefore 
tend to show that the uncertainties in inputs have not 
been increased through the proposed model but, on 
the contrary, are even sometimes partially mitigated. 
To give some explanations, the two operators used in 
the fault tree analyses (relating to an and-gate and to 
an or-gate) are investigated in this section, according 
to the expectancies E[.], and the variances V[.]. 
Let pa and pb be two independent random vari-
ables (in accordance with the hypotheses given in 
Section 3.2), then: 
     baba pEpEppE   (3) 
         
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With the following operator: 
)1()1(1    (7) 
Equations (3) and (5) explain that the mean values of 
PFDavg obtained in Section 4.4 are nearly equal to 
the value obtained in Section 4.3. Moreover, the fol-
lowing statements can be deduced from Equations 
(4) and (6), (see proof in Appendix): 













































Equations (8) and (9) give the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions on two input random variables so 
that the corresponding operation gets a lower vari-
ance than any of the inputs. Because these conditions 
are often fulfilled by the random variables of Tables 4 
and 5, resulting variances of PFDavg are relatively 
small. Due to dependencies between MCS, it is, 
however, difficult to recursively apply Equations (4) 
and (6) to obtain PFDavg variance by calculations. 
6 CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented safety requirements for the 
SIS design in accordance with IEC 61508. Special is-
sues of type B systems are discussed. While several 
research works have been undertaken to deal with 
uncertainties in failure rates for reliability evaluation, 
modelling the uncertain behaviour of the system un-
der fault conditions has been less investigated. This 
paper therefore proposes a modelling method 
adapted to the evaluation of failure probabilities for 
these complex systems. 
Within the fault tree modelling framework, the 
key feature of the method is the use of weighted 
“continuous gates”. By acting on the weight values, 
it is possible to continuously graduate the system part 
architecture between parallel and series structures. 
The behaviour of the system under fault conditions is 
therefore parameterised so that the uncertainty on the 
system architecture can be translated into a paramet-
ric uncertainty. Moreover, such analyses can be per-
formed by classical fault tree tools using equivalent 
fault trees with classical gates and fictitious events. 
An intelligent transmitter is used as example. The 
probability of failure on demand is assessed, and both 
failure rates and behaviour uncertainty analyses are 
performed by Monte Carlo simulations. The resulting 
average probabilities of failure on demand are used 
to determine the probability of safety integrity level 
(SIL) fulfilment, according to IEC 61508, and taking 
the undetermined system behaviour under fault con-
ditions into account. The resulting uncertainties in 
probabilities of failure are orders of magnitude lower 
than the uncertainties in any of the input weights, as 
shown by the variance results. Some discussions are 
proposed to give some explanations of this property. 
These analyses therefore tend to show that the lack 
of knowledge in system behaviour can be accounted 
for and partially compensated for by this kind of fault 
tree, in order to evaluate probabilities of system fail-



















7.1 Proof of (1) 




























































































































































































































7.2 Proof of (8) 
According to (7): 
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